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We study the implications of a stockout constraint in a dynamic general
equilibrium model, which can explain both RBC and inventory facts well. Under
the stockout constraint, inventories and demand are complements in generating
sales, and hence the optimal level of inventories increases in expected demand. We
also show that the inventory to sales ratio is both persistent and countercyclical
because the cost of carrying inventories is mainly determined by the interest rate.
We use this model to disentangle output and sales, by matching the key inventory
moments, and nd that preference and productivity shocks are equally important
in data. Finally, we assess whether improvements in inventory management can
explain the Great Moderation. We nd that, although improvements in inventory
management can reduce the need for inventory holdings, which decreases output
volatility relative to sales volatility, lower levels of inventories actually increases
sales volatility. Because these two e¤ects o¤set each other, a change in inventory
management does not change output volatility to any great extent.
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Inventories represent the di¤erence between production and sales and thus, broadly
speaking, place a wedge between the demand and supply sides of the economy and this
wedge actually continues to be of great importance in the analysis of business cycles.1
Table 1 shows the contribution of inventory investment to the output decline in the
most recent, and largest, postwar recession in 2007-9 was some 33% and, although
smaller than the average postwar contribution, can hardly be said to be insignicant.
Accordingly inventory accumulation has been placed at the centre of the production
and sales adjustment process but despite an extensive literature on inventories, most
existing theoretical studies of inventories focus only on a rm or industry level analysis
and there are relatively few general equilibrium analyses.2 The motivation of our work
is thus to investigate, within a exible price micro-founded dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium model, the role of inventories in the presence of a stockout constraint, in
which no intermediate seller can sell more products to a nal goods producer than
the inventories they hold, whilst focussing on interplay between output, demand and
stockout probability.3
Our work shows that the introduction of this constraint leads to the model satisfying
the well-known stylized facts on inventories: production (output) is more volatile than
sales; inventory investment is procyclical; and the inventory to sales (I/S) ratio is
countercyclical and persistent.4 The mechanism that our model mimics these facts
has already been revealed by Kahn (1987, 1992), and, in this sense, our model can be
regarded as the general equilibrium extension of his work. Under the stockout constraint,
the key trade-o¤ in the inventory management is that having low levels of inventories
risks losing sales opportunities but having excess inventories imposes a cost of carry. We
briey review how this trade-o¤ generates the inventory facts in our model.
First, the probability of losing sales opportunity is an increasing function of expected
demand, which means that producers  sellers of intermediate goods in our model 
1Much early quantitative work was directed towards understanding the nature and causes of the
inventory cycle. Schumpeters (1939) analysis of the business cycle placed considerable weight on
Kitchins (1923) observation of cycles being associated with unintended changes in inventories. This
point was followed by Metzler (1941) who formulated a model of the duration of inventory cycle and
as an accelerator mechanism in nal output. And inventories continue to account for a large share of
GDP uctuations, particularly in recessions. For example, Fitzgerald (1997) reports that changes in
inventory investment are, on average, more than one-third the size of quarterly changes in real GDP
over the post-war period. See also Blinder and Maccini (1991).
2To name a few, Hornstein and Sarte (2001), Boileau and Letendre (2004) and Jung and Yun (2005)
for inventory analysis in a sticky price environment, and Fisher and Hornstein (2000) for the (S,s)
model. See below for Khan and Thomas (2007a and 2007b), Wen (2011) and Wang and Wen (2009).
3Note also we undertake our analysis without any recourse of costs of investment, as in much of the
extant literature.
4Theoretical studies of inventories started with production smoothing and bu¤er stock inventories in
which strong demand implies that buyers take inventories from sellers (thus, inventories decrease when
demand is strong) and, hence, these inventory facts had been considered to be puzzling.
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need a higher level of inventories in booms, and this explains the rst two stylized
facts. Looking at this more closely, consider a positive demand shock,5 in which an
increase in demand naturally leads to the same increase in output, in absence of any
inventories. But with the addition of inventories, under a stockout constraint, producers
produce more to accumulate inventories to avoid too high a stockout probability. In
this respect, we can treat inventories and demand as inputs in producing sales, and so
these two inputs are complements to each other. In this paper, we focus on this nature
of inventories  sellers inventory management in producing sales. Note that, even
without the stockout constraint, inventories can work as a bu¤er against unanticipated
demand shocks. Hence, inventories and sales are positively correlated to each other at
business cycle frequencies but negatively correlated at higher frequencies, as reported
by Ramey and West (1999) and Wen (2005).
Second, the cost of holding inventories, or the cost of carry, is the opportunity cost
of carrying inventories from one period to the next, i.e., the interest income that would
be obtained by holding savings instead. Hence, the optimal level of inventories (relative
to sales) is decreasing in the real interest rate, or the external nancing cost of holding
inventories paid by producers, as pointed out by Bernanke and Gertler (1995). This
explains the third inventory fact, that the I/S ratio is countercyclical and persistent,
simply because the interest rate is procyclical and persistent, see also Bils and Kahn
(2000) and Bils (2004).
Producers hold inventories in order to overcome the stockout constraint that would
otherwise hinder trade between sellers and buyers and hence we refer to the inventory
holdings due to this motivation as distributorsdemand. Because distributorsdemand
amplies a demand shock, it might be tempting to infer that distributors demand
also amplies overall output volatility and, in our model, production is indeed more
volatile than sales. This idea has been taken up by others, such as Kahn, McConnell,
and Perez-Quiros (2002), as an explanation for the Great Moderation. Our numerical
exercises however show that having more inventories crowds out capital investment and
consumption, given the resource constraint. This means that, as inventory management
improves distributorsdemand for inventories decreases, which in turn leads to a weaker
crowding-out for investment and consumption. As a result, the volatility of demand
increases along with improvements in inventory management. In sum, relaxing the
stockout constraint gradually, we nd that, certainly output volatility relative to sales
decreases, but the volatility of sales per se increases. And so, in our model, improving
inventory management cannot solely explain any Great Moderation.
5Note that, with supply shocks (technology shocks), it is not surprising for above two inventory facts
to hold; production is more volatile than sales simply because the source of shocks is on the production
side, and hence inventory investment is procyclical simply because an increase in sales is not enough to
absorb the increase in production (see Blinder (1986) for example). What is important in this article
is that, even if the source of shocks lies on the demand side, production is still more volatile than sales.
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Our research is closely related to that of Khan and Thomas (2007b). Their
(S,s) inventory management model has some success in replicating inventory facts
qualitatively and quantitatively, while their stockout constraint generates almost no
inventories in the steady state; see also Khan and Thomas (2007a). Di¤erent from their
stockout constraint model, our model can mimic the inventory behavior both in the
steady state and uctuation around it. This is mainly because we assume price posting
and positive prot margin. If prices are perfectly exible, the demand for goods will
then adjust until it is equated to the inventories to be sold. Also, if the net prot
margin is zero, to avoid a positive cost of inventory carry, rms will optimally choose
zero inventories. That is, producers must be compensated by a positive prot margin
when their goods are sold; otherwise, they do not want to take the risk of the cost of
carry when their goods are unsold; see the discussion of return dominance in Khan and
Thomas (2007a). In Khan and Thomas (2007a), only if marginal costs are expected to
increase to a su¢ ciently large degree, producers may choose to hold inventories to exploit
a negative cost of carry. We argue, however, that such inventories are held not because of
the stockout avoidance but because of a production smoothing motive, where producers
want to produce their products when their production cost is low and store them in the
form of inventories. Note that we do not intend to claim that the stockout model is
superior to (S,s) model; rather, in our opinion, the (S,s) ordering model is more suitable
in explaining buyers inventory management, while our stockout constraint model is
actually also suitable for the analysis of sellers inventory management as well.6
In parallel work, Wen (2011) andWang andWen (2009) develop a refrigeratormodel
that assumes the stockout takes place on the buyers side. That is, buyers buy goods, keep
them in their refrigerator (or warehouses) and when an unanticipated preference shock
takes place they face stockouts for their favorite goods and carry less preferred goods as
inventory investments into the next period. This device essentially study the stockout
constraint as buyersproblem by conating sellers and buyers, while it allow them to
replicate the inventory stylized facts. Unlike these works, our model however takes the
stockout constraint as the sellersproblem and by doing so we can explicitly study the
double-sided nature of the stockout constraint. While the inventory management is
primarily of sellers under the stockout constraint, the stockout also a¤ects the buyers
side as well. That is, if a seller face a stockout, it means that there must be at least
6We do not believe that, as often claimed, the (S,s) and the stockout constraint models are limited to
retailersinventories and producersnal goods inventories, respectively. Certainly, some evidence such
as Blinder and Maccini (1991) show that inventories of intermediate goods and raw material explain
the majority of inventory investment. But, it is plausible that, within a manufacturing company, a
manager of a division, which is at the middle of the production line, employs an (S,s) rule to order
intermediate goods to an upstream division, and at the same time he holds the output of his division to
avoid stockout when he gets an order from the downstream division. The point is, as long as there are
frictions and some degree of uncertainty in the demand for and/or the supply to a division at the timing
of decision making, there is a non-trivial optimisation problem even in pipeline inventory management.
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one buyer who also faces a stockout. Having explicit interaction between sellers and
buyers, we can explicitly discuss, for example, the stockout probabilities for sellers
and buyers separately. In addition, in our model, we can separate output and sales,
and hence we can explicitly experiment the model to see the relative importance of
demand and supply shocks. Also, Kryvtsov and Midrigan (2010) extend their work
(2008) and consider a sticky wage and price model where rms hold inventories to avoid
a stockout in the face of a demand shock. Their main interest is the role of inventories in
explaining impulse response functions (IRFs) to a monetary policy shock and so mostly
the countercyclicality of the I/S ratio is examined. In addition, a new aspect of our
research is that we explicitly use moment matching to explore the importance of both
preference and technology shock and so can study the stockout probability as generating
gaps between output and sales.
The paper is organized in the following manner: Section 2 describes the model;
Section 3 shows its simulation results; and nally Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
This section rst outlines the assumptions specic to our model, and then describes the
optimization problems of a representative household, nal goods rms, and intermediate
goods rms in this order. Finally, we discuss the problems of aggregation and equilibrium
determination.
2.1 Overview and Model Specic Assumptions
This subsection gives an overview of the model. There are three types of agents; a
representative household, nal goods producers (nal rms) and intermediate goods
producers (intermediate rms). The household consumes, invests and supplies labour
and capital to intermediate rms.7 Intermediate rms use labour and capital to produce
intermediate goods, which is sold to the nal rms in the intermediate goods markets.
Final goods rms can be thought of as retailers as they simply convert di¤erent types
of intermediate goods into identical nal goods.
It is the intermediate goods markets that are subject to the stockout constraint; that
is, no intermediate rm can sell more goods than they have on their shelf, even if more
buyers than expected appear. Given double-sided nature of the stockout constraint,
7Being precise, the distribution of households must have the same dimension as that of nal and
intermediate rms. Otherwise we would lose consistency; e.g., output (supplied by high dimension
agents) cannot be equated to consumption and investment (demanded by a low dimension agent). For
our model, this issue can be particularly important, because the dimensionality of agentsdistribution is
non-standard. However, under the conventional assumptions, such as perfect risk-sharing, all households
behave identically. Hence, throughout this paper, we treat households collectively as a representative
household to keep our exposition simple.
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the optimization problems of these two types of rms are shaped accordingly, while
the households optimization is quite standard. Throughout this paper, a buyerand
a sellerare always an intermediate rm and a nal rm, respectively.8 Also, unless
confusing, we use inventoriesto signify unsold goods or goods on shelf depending on
the context, while inventory investment always means the change in unsold goods.
Before discussing the agents optimizations, the rest of this subsection explains two
model specic assumptions; (1) distribution of sellers and buyers, which facilitates
aggregation, and (2) timing assumption for sellersdecision making, which makes the
stockout constraint meaningful.
2.1.1 Distribution of Sellers and Buyers
As discussed, in the intermediate goods markets, intermediate goods rms (sellers) sell
intermediate goods to nal goods rms (buyers), but the key friction here is the stockout
constraint. Here, we discuss some additional assumptions that make the stockout
constraint sensible.
First, the intermediate goods are di¤erentiated á la Dixit-Stiglitz. A positive prot
margin is necessary to encourage sellers to have inventories. As discussed further below,
the stockout constraint is costly for sellers, because there is always the risk that some
goods are unsold. However, if sellers are rewarded by zero prot margin when they sell
their goods, there is no incentive for them to hold inventories; see the discussion on the
return dominance found in Khan and Thomas (2007b) in this relation.9
Second, to capture the production di¤erentiation, the variety of intermediate goods
distributes over a line segment [0; 1]; or equivalently, we can understand this as there
are innitely many markets for di¤erent types of intermediate goods. To facilitate
aggregation, we further assume that there is a unit mass of sellers for each variety. In
total, there are a continuum of sellers who distribute over a rectangle [0; 1] [0; 1]. For
a certain variety of goods (i.e., within a single intermediate good market), intermediate
goods producers sell the identical goods.
Third, to keep consistency, we assume that nal goods producers also distribute over
[0; 1]  [0; 1]; i.e., a buyer is represented by a point on rectangle [0; 1]  [0; 1]. Also, a
buyer (i) visits all markets but (ii) visits only one seller in each market. The former
means that on average a seller sees a unit mass of buyers [0; 1]. The latter means that
there are always buyers who cannot buy goods due to the stockout. That is, assumption
(ii) is necessary because, if instead we allow these unlucky buyers to search around other
sellers in the same market, they will nd goods at the end of the day, meaning that
8Furthermore we shall, on occasion, refer to he as the intermediate rm, or seller, and to she as the
nal goods rm, or buyer.
9See Appendix A.2, which describes the limit that monopolistic competition approaches to perfect
competition.
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there must be no unsold goods or stockout. This further implies that, under Dixit-
Stigliz monopolistic competition, the stockout is costly not only for sellers but also for
buyers. Because the lost varieties cannot be perfectly substituted by other varieties, to
produce a certain level of nal goods, they have to buy more quantities for available
varieties, which leads to an increase in the production cost of nal rms.
Given distributions of agents over a rectangle, there are two measures corresponding
to two aggregation modes; aggregation within a market and aggregation over the
markets. Roughly speaking, a continuum of intermediate rms in each market allows us
to aggregate sellersside, while having innitely many varieties we can aggregate buyers
behavior. For the former, however, the more important assumption for aggregation is
constant returns to scale production technology, which we discuss in detail in Section
2.5. For the latter, intuitively, di¤erent buyers can buy di¤erent sets of varieties, but
the measure of available varieties is the same for all buyers.
2.1.2 Idiosyncratic Shocks and Timing Assumption
We think that sellers hold inventories because of the demand uncertainty and in this
paper that is captured by an idiosyncratic shock; specically, the number of buyers
N jit who visit a sellers is stochastic and hence is di¤erent among sellers. Superscript
ji indicates seller j in market i; e.g., N jit reads the number of buyers who seller j in
market i meets at time t. To make the stockout constraint meaningful, we imposes two
restrictions on both buyersand sellerssides. As already discussed, given double-sided
nature of the stockout constraint, the stockout constraint not only a¤ects sellers but also
buyers.
On the sellers side, we assume that each seller must decide both production and
price levels before observing his demand shock. More specically, we have to assume
that sellers determine their production before observing N jit , because otherwise they
can adjust their production level to avoid stockout and unsold goods. Similarly, we have
to assume that sellers decide their sales price before observing N jit , which we call price
posting, because otherwise they can adjust their price level so that demand equals goods
that they have on shelf. For example, if a seller faces a lot of buyers, he can increase
his sales price to exploit his strong demand shock. This increase in price reduces the
demand per buyer, but he does not care, because anyway he has too many customers.
Similarly, if a seller receives only a few buyers, he can stimulate the demand per buyer
by discounting his sales price to avoid the cost of carrying unsold goods to the next
period. As a result, no stockout or unsold goods take place without price posting; see
our discussion about Khan and Thomas (2007b) in Introduction.
On the buyersside, as discussed in the previous subsection, when a buyer cannot
buy a variety of goods, we do not allow her to visit other shops; that is, if seller j has too
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many buyers N jit , some lucky buyers (say, those on the forepart of the queue) can buy as
much as they want, but some unlucky buyers cannot buy the goods at all.10 This implies
that buyers also su¤er from the stockout constraint, which leads to an increase in the
marginal cost of producing nal goods under product di¤erentiation among intermediate
goods.
In addition, in our numerical experiments, we also assume that the household decides
its labour supply before observing the current period aggregate shocks. This assumption
is perhaps reasonable given infrequent nature of labour contract. Even without this, the
model captures the inventory behavior at the business cycle frequencies almost equally
well. But without this informational assumption, given weak convexity of the cost
function of the intermediate rms, our model cannot capture the high frequency behavior
of inventory investment in response to unanticipated shocks.11 In this sense, it seems
that the capital adjustment cost in Wen (2011) plays the similar role to our informational
imperfection for the labour decision, while having capital adjustment cost tends to yield
too low investment volatility; see Table 3 in Wen (2011).
2.2 Household
The household optimization is quite standard. The innitely-lived representative
household maximizes expected lifetime utility. The household supplies capital and

























Kt +WtHt +Dt; (2a)
Ct + It = Y
F
t ; (2b)
Kt+1 = (1  )Kt + It: (2c)
The household maximizes the present value of time separable period utility U [:; :] with
subjective discount factor t. For the period utility, we assume that the cross partial is
zero @2U=@Ct@Ht = 0. Parameter  governs the relative importance of leisure 1  Ht,
where Ht is hours worked in period t, while 
 is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion.
We follow Khan and Thomas (2007a) and introduce a preference shock Ct , which follows
10Another possible setup is pro rata allocation of goods to all buyers. However, in this case,
anticipating the possibility of stockout, buyers have an incentive to overstate their demand, which
complicates the analysis. Also, in this case, the amount that a buyer buys may di¤er across varieties,
which triggers a further complication in aggregation.
11In our simulation results presented in Table 9, we allow for changes in these assumptions.
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an AR(1) process. Later, we interpret it as a demand shock. As mentioned above, we
assume that households cannot respond to current period aggregate shocks in their
labour supply decision.
The rst constraint shows the period budget constraint. While the period expense
comprises the purchase of nal, or retail, goods Y Ft and bond purchases Bt+1, the period
revenue is the sum of the gross return on bonds purchased in the previous period RBt Bt,




Kt, labour income WtHt and dividends Dt. The
household takes gross bond return RBt , gross capital return R
K
t and wage Wt as givens.
Final goods purchased Y Ft can be used as consumption Ct and investment It. The third
constraint shows the evolution of capital, where  is its depreciation rate.


















where s; = 
@U=@C
@Us=@Cs
for   s  0 is the stochastic discount factor, SDF.
2.3 Final Goods Firms
The role of nal goods producers is to convert intermediate goods into nal goods using













whereM b;it is the i-th variety of intermediate goods, which is measured in physical units,
and Qit is the indicator variable, which is 1 if this nal rm has access to variety i and
0 otherwise. Intuitively, Qit picks up the varieties that she actually buys. Parameter
 > 1 is the elasticity of substitution among intermediate goods. For the nal rms
optimization, we drop superscript j because nal goods rms do not care the identity of
sellers in each market; also, we do not need to track the identity of buyers, because our
economic environment ensures that nal rmsbehavior is symmetric. Given (4), each









where PM;it is the price of the i-th intermediate goods.
There are a number of issues worth considering. First, we dene the measure of the
9





Because idiosyncratic shocks determine whether a nal rm can buy a variety or not,
Qit di¤ers among buyers. However, the law of large numbers (LLN) guarantees that the
value of Qt must be the same for all buyers (nal rms). At the same time, Qt also
denes the probability that each buyer can buy a certain type of intermediate goods,
and hence 1 Qt is the stockout probability for buyers.12
Second, (4) can be regarded as a quantity index, and one of possible intermediate


















where F;MCt is the marginal cost of nal goods production. We have chosen this price
index, because this is the average price of available intermediate goods,13 which is
perhaps the most closest concept to the actual price indices such as the producer price
index. As a result of the stockout constraint, the price index is not equal to the marginal





t is equated to 
F;MC
t at optimum.





t  PMt , i.e. the e¤ective intermediate goods price is
higher than the price index, which is one representation of the cost of stockout on the
buyersside.
Third, as we assume a competitive nal goods market, from the zero prot condition,
we obtain F;MCt = 1, where the price of nal goods is normalized to be 1. From (7),






t = 1: (8)
Clearly, the intermediate goods price is lower than nal goods price; PMt  1. Intuitively,
because intermediate goods markets are not e¢ cient due to the stockout constraint, if
the average intermediate goods price is the same as the nal goods price, nal goods
rms su¤er from the business losses. To have zero prot, the intermediate goods price
must be lower than the nal goods price. Term Q
 1
 1
t > 1 in (8) represents the cost of
losing varieties.
Fourth, the rst order condition with respect to M b;it leads to the following demand
12As we need some additional notation, we derive this result formally in Section 2.4.1 again.









Qitdi: On the contrary, our quantity index (4) is a sort of summation. To see







function, which will appear as a constraint in the intermediate goods rmsoptimization
problem in the next subsection:








Y Ft : (9)
Note that, unlike the standard demand function, which depends on relative prices alone,
there is an additional term Q =( 1)t , which is another expression of the ine¢ ciency
arising from the stockout constraint. To understand this argument, consider the
symmetric equilibrium, in which PM;it =P
M
t = 1,













t ; i.e., output Y
F




t is another representation of the cost of losing varieties. Note that QtM
b;i
t is
the physical amount that a nal rm buys, because it is the number of available varieties
Qt times the quantity M
b;i
t of each variety actually purchased. Intuitively, as a result of
product di¤erentiation, the lack of access to some varieties leads to some ine¢ ciency in
production (4), and hence more inputs are required to produce a certain level of Y Ft .














Again, the multiplicative term Q
 1
 1
t > 1 in (10) represents the cost of losing varieties.
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Note that we have shown the cost of stockout on the buyersside in (7), (8), (9) and
(10), but all of them point to the same ine¢ ciency from di¤erent angles. Of course,
if nal rms have access to all types of intermediate goods (Qt = 1), or if there is no




2.4 Intermediate Goods Firms
Intermediate rms are also subject to the stockout constraint. They take the nal rms
demand curve as a constraint; compare (9) and (12d).
max
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The j-th intermediate rm in the i-th market maximizes the present value of current
and future net cash inow. It takes wage Wt and return on capital RKt as given (hence
no ji superscripts). Section 2.2 denes the stochastic discount factor 0;t.
The rst constraint shows the stockout constraint for sales; Sjit is the minimum of
goods on shelf Gjit and demand for intermediate goods M
ji
t . The second and third
constraints are for the evolution of unsold goods U jit+1 and the denition of goods on
shelf Gjit . We assume intermediate rms can place all of todays output Y
M;ji
t in todays
market but, if demand is weak, unsold goods are carried into the next period. The fourth
constraint states total demand M jit as demand per buyer M
b;ji
t times number of buyers
N jit and, as a result of monopolistic competition, demand per buyerM
b;ji
t decreases in its
relative sales price PM;jit =P
M
t .
16 The last constraint shows that the production function
is Cobb-Douglas with capital share  and productivity shock Mt . We assume that 
M
t
follows an AR(1) process.
2.4.1 Deriving Some Key Expressions
Before considering the optimization, we can obtain some key expressions, which are
essentially alternative representations of some of the constraints. The discussion in this










njit   ( ) ; (13c)
where  is the vector of parameters of the probability density function  of njit . Later,
we limit  so that the expected value of N jit , which must be the total measure of buyers
in each market, is normalized to be one. Since the number of buyers cannot be negative,
16Recall that Qt appears in the demand curve because of the cost of losing varieties; see (9).
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Given these, we dene the following three variables: (a) sellersstockout probability
jit , (b) buyerscost of stockout ~
ji








t ] = 1  (gjit ; ); (15a)
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t ) = E^[N
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t jnjit > gjit ]jit (gjit ); (15b)
E^t[S
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where  is the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of njit , and the hat notation on
E^t[ ] indicates that the information set includes all information up to time t except
for idiosyncratic shock njit at t.
18 For ~jit , E^[N
ji
t jnjit > gjit ] is the expected number of
buyers conditional that the stockout takes place. That is, in the sellers expectation
formation, E^[N jit jnjit > gjit ]   Gjit shows the number of excess buyers who he loses due
to the stockout constraint, if it is binding.19 Note that both jit and ~
ji
t are strictly




t is also a function of only g
ji
t (as well as parameters
 ) and is increasing in gjit .
In our numerical experiments below, we assume a log-normal distribution for N jit .
That is, ( ; 0:52N ; N) is the cdf of the normal distribution with mean  2N=2 and
variance 2N , so that E^[N
ji
t ] = 1, where N governs the size of the idiosyncratic shock.
In this case, it is clear that jit and ~
ji
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= 1  (gjit ; +0:52N ; N); (16b)
E^t[S
ji









17Corresponding to these expressions, we have already obtained (a) buyersstockout probability, (b)
buyerscost of stockout and (c) varieties available to each buyer in Section 2.3.
18Here, to derive the second line of (15c), we use the normalization assumption: 1 = E^t[N
ji
t ]
= E^[N jit jnjit < gjit ]

1  jit (gjit )

+ E^[N jit jnjit > gjit ]jit (gjit ).
19Hence, perhaps it is more natural to dene buyers cost of stockout as the expected number of
lost buyers; (E^[N jit jnjit > gjit ]   Gjit )jit (gjit ). But, we nd the above denition signicantly reduces
notations.
20Here, to derive ~jit and E^t[S
ji










Finally, as mentioned in Section 2.3, we can now show Qt also means the probability
that a buyer does not face stockout. To show this, let N jit be the number of buyers who










N jit otherwise (not stockout)
:
Due to LLN, the buyersprobability of not facing stockout Qt equals the number of


































Previewing our results, in equilibrium, (i) demand per buyer is the same for all buyers;
M b;jit = M
b
t (see Section A.1), and (ii) aggregate sales equals expected sales by LLN;
St = E^t[S
ji
t ]. Hence, (17) and (16c) imply that the aggregate sales is the number of




Now, having above expressions, we are able to show some key di¤erentiations.
Assuming that sellers (intermediate goods rms) decide their production and price before
observingN jit , their optimization requires the knowledge of the derivatives of E^t[S
ji
t ] with
respect to their choice variables. We assume that  is continuously di¤erentiable (here,
we do not rely on the log-normal assumption). Now, E^t[S
ji






































(dnjit ) = 1  Pr[M jit < Gjit ] = jit ; (19)
where note that @(M b;jit e












t (dnjit ) = E^[N
ji
t jnjit < gjit ]
 
1  jit (gjit )

= 1  ~jit : (20)
Here, we can o¤er an important intuition that goods on shelf Gjit and demand M
b;ji
t are
21See also Section 2.3 for the discussion about (8).
22Hence, our idiosyncratic shock allows us to avoid dealing with the kinked constraint (12a) directly.
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compliments in the sense that, as shown in (19), the marginal salesgenerated by an




t is strictly increasing in M
b;ji
t . The same
sort of complementarity between Gjit and M
b;ji
t can be also found in (20). Because of
this, sellers want to have more inventories to capture strong demand and hence we refer
to this accumulation of Gjit following strong demand as distributorsdemand, which we
discuss further in the following sections.
We also use the following results to derive the FOCs of intermediate goods rms.











































2.4.2 FOCs for Intermediate Goods Firms
Now, we can solve the optimization problem (11) and (12). In (21), the last two FOCs are
standard; wage equals marginal product of labour and the net rental rate of capital equals
the marginal product of capital where the values of marginal products are evaluated in




















oi  U;jit ; (21b)















   RKt   1 : (21e)
The rst condition (21a) is with respect to the price of intermediate goods PM;jit .
Rearranging, we obtain the time-varying markup formula, where e¤ective elasticity of
















23The results in Section 2.4.1 are used to derive them.
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The second condition (21b) is with respect to unsold goods U jit+1 and makes clear that




t , where 
U;ji
t can also be regarded as the cost of
sales in accounting. The terms inside the curly bracket of (21b) mean thatmarginal U jit+1
can be sold with probability jit+1 or left unsold with probability 1  jit+1 at t+1; if it is
sold it generates revenue PM;jit+1 , but, if not, it is carried to the next period t+ 2 and its
value is U;jit+1 at the end of t+1. Hence, this condition says that, at the optimum, todays
shadow price U;jit is equal to the present value of U
ji
t+1. In addition, if sellersstockout







which shows the production smoothing; in this sense, our model incorporates a bu¤er



















The third condition (21c) is with respect to output Y M;jt . In a similar manner to (21b),
if sold production generates revenue PM;jit , but if not it is carried to the next period and
its value is U;jit . Hence, (21c) says that, at optimum, marginal cost 
MC;ji
t is equal to
the value of the marginal unit of Y M;jit .
2.5 Aggregation
Aggregation is non-trivial in this model because an individual sellers unsold goods U jit
di¤ers across the set of intermediate rms due to the idiosyncratic shock N jit 1. However,
we show that, given di¤erent U jit , intermediate rms choose di¤erent Y
M;ji
t so that they
have the same nal choice of Gjit = Gt; in other words, all intermediate rms choose
identical Gjit regardless of U
ji
t by choosing di¤erent Y
M;ji
t .
24 This crucially depends
on the assumption of constant returns to scale (CRS) production, which guarantees




t+1 . Hence, (21b) and (21c) imply that
U;jit = 
U














Because jit and ~
ji
t are both strictly increasing in g
ji
t under log-normal N
ji
t , the both
sides of this expression are strictly increasing and decreasing in gjit respectively (note
that MCt   Ut > 0), which means this expression uniquely pins down gjit as a function
24Related to this, we would like to note that, although aggregate output is always positive, there is a
possibility of having negative production at individual intermediate goods producerslevel. Certainly,
allowing negative production is counter-intuitive, but there is no inconsistency. Under our timing
assumption that they cannot have negative production after observing the demand shock, such a
negative production cannot negate the stockout constraint; see Appendix 2.5 for further discussion.
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of variables that are independent from ji. Hence, jit = t and ~
ji
t = ~t for all ji.
Given these, (21a) implies PM;jit = P
M





of (9). Since gjit does not depend on ji, G
ji
t is also the same for all ji. In sum, we
do not impose symmetricity assumption, but the equilibrium must be symmetric.25
Intuitively, while CRS guarantees that all intermediate rms face same marginal cost
MCt , intermediate rmsrst order conditions depend on E^t[S
ji
t ], which is ex ante the
same for all intermediate rms because they do not observe idiosyncratic shock N jit






t , the probability of
stockout and its associated costs (t and ~t) are the same for all intermediate rms.













t under CRS. Again, appealing
to LLN, aggregate sales St is equal to the expected sales of a seller E^t[S
ji
t ]; see (16c).





t (1  ~t) +Gtt; (24)
We know that aggregate Gt and aggregate Ut+1 is simply given by their denitions (12c)
and (12b), which are linear. For the other variables, due to the above symmetricity, we
can obtain aggregated variables simply by dropping superscripts j and i.
2.6 Equilibrium
The core part of the model has 19 endogenous variables and 19 equations. Because all
agents behave symmetrically, we drop o¤ superscript ji in the following. In our model,
given the initial condition fU0; K0g, the proper transversality (non-explosive) conditions
and exogenous shocks fMt ; gtg1t=0, the equilibrium is dened as the set of variables
fRBt ; RKt ;Wt; PMt ; Qt; t; ~t; Ut ; MCt ; Ct; Ht;MFt ; Y Mt ; It; St;M bt ; Gt; Ut+1; Kt+1g1t=0 that
satises the following equilibrium conditions:
- Household constraints (2b-c) and its FOCs (3);
- Final goods rmsFOCs (8);
- Intermediate goods rmsconstraints (12b-e) and their FOCs (21); and
- Denitions and aggregation of variables (16a), (16b), (18) and (24).
3 Numerical Results
This section describes the quantitative properties of the model. The model developed
in Section 2 is numerically simulated by linearizing the equilibrium equations around
the non-stochastic steady state; see Section 2.6. Note that aggregate sales St is a
25This symmetric result is similar to that in Lagos and Wright (2005). We thank the Editor for
pointing this out.
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smooth function (though individual sales Sjit are not) and hence it can be linearized.
We have two sources of shocks: productivity and preferences. We interpret the former
as a supply shock and the latter as a demand shock, although we must be cautious
about such labelling.26 We compare our model performance with U.S. data and a no-
inventory version of the model, which is obtained simply by setting N = 0. Though
there are several minor di¤erences from the standard RBC model, such as imperfect
substitution among varieties, the no-inventory version can be regarded as a variant of
the standard RBC model comparable to the benchmark experiments. Finally, note that,
in aggregate, our model falls into the class of the models with representative agents and
exible prices.27 One period in our model is one quarter, and we mainly focus on the
business cycle frequencies by using the Baxter-King band-pass lter in obtaining the
second moments.
3.1 Basic Inventory Facts
Before examining numerical results, let us remind ourselves of the key inventory facts.
1. Inventory investment is procyclical at business cycle frequencies.
Following Khan and Thomas (2007b), we measure inventory investment by dUt+1=Yt
rather than dUt+1 = Ut+1   Ut. Note that we cannot take the logarithm of dUt+1 since
it can be negative, while, using dUt+1 as it is, the resultant moments are a¤ected by the
measurement unit. As the rst column of Table 5 shows, if procyclicality is measured
by its correlation with output, it is 0:64 at business cycle frequencies and is 0:49 at high
frequencies. However, corfdUt+1=Yt; Stg at business cycle frequencies is 0:41 (not shown)
but  0:42 at high frequencies. As Wen (2005) discussed, this is because inventories
work as a bu¤er at high frequencies. Inventory investment is positively correlated to
both output and sales at business cycle frequencies but these correlations di¤er between
output and sales at high frequencies.
2. Output Yt is more volatile than sales St.
As shown in Table 5, the ratio of volatilities between output and sales is less than
one;  (St) = (Yt) = 0:83. This is the same at high frequencies but a lesser extent:
 (St) = (Yt) = 0:93 (not shown).
3. I/S ratio is countercyclical and persistent.
This fact is reported by Ramey and West (1999) and Wen (2005). In our notation,
inventory-to-sales (I/S) ratio is Ut=St. In our data set, corfUt=St; Ytg =  0:52 and
corfUt=St; Ut 1=St 1g = 0:88. This is the same fact that Blinder and Maccini (1991)
considered implausible, when implementing a reduced form regression and nding that
26For example, even the technology shock stimulates demand through wage and capital return.
27Although we assume price posting (see Section 2.1.2), meaning that intermediate goods prices PM;jit
cannot react to idiosyncratic shock N jit , they (and their index P
M
t ) can react to all aggregate shocks.
Hence, in our model, there is no nominal rigidity in aggregate.
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the adjustment speed of the inventory is quite slow, given the fact that even the widest
swings in inventory stocks amount to no more than a few days of production(Blinder
and Maccini, 1991, p.81).
We note that, given the high correlation between output and sales in the data, the
traditional inventory facts (1) and (2) at the business cycle frequency essentially restate
the same fact from two di¤erent angles. This is evident form the law of motion of
inventories (25a), taking variances after moving terms,

















> 0 is a necessary condition




. A similar manipulation shows that Cov (dUt+1; St) > 0




. Note that output and sales are
very closely correlated to each other in data, implying that measuring procyclicality







> 0 is almost equivalent to Cov (dUt+1; St) > 0. Hence, procyclical
inventory investment implies more volatile output than sales, and vice versa.
3.2 Parameter Selection and Steady State
For the standard RBC parameters, we follow conventional values to facilitate the
comparison (see Table 2), which generate reasonable steady state values (see Table 3).
In the steady state, consumption and investment are around 80% and 15% of output,
respectively. Relative weight for leisure in the utility function is set so that working
hours are roughly 1=3 of time endowment. Capital depreciation rate is matched to
capital stock/annual GDP ratio, which is around 2:6. For the elasticity of substitution
among varieties , we set it to be 7:5, which is rather common in the standard new
Keynesian models. Steady state stockout probability ss is mainly a¤ected by , and
 = 7:5 generates a plausible stockout probability 8:1% (see Bils (2004)).28
To see the e¤ects of inventories, we experiment with several sizes of idiosyncratic
shocks N = f0:00; 0:40; 1:73g, where N = 0:0 is essentially the RBC model, and
N = 0:4, which leads to inventory-to-sales ratio Uss=Sss = 0:66 (around two months) in
the steady state; see Table 6 for the results with N = 0:4. In data, inventory-to-sales
ratio is roughly two months; see Bils (2004) for example. We have chosen N = 1:73 by
matching the key inventory moments, which we discuss further in the next subsection.
In our numerical experiments, we mainly consider the model behavior with N = 1:73
rather than targeting a particular value of Uss=Sss, because (i) there is no service sector
28The key determinant of ss is the net prot margin. For example, we can have the same stockout
probability by instead adding annual convenience yield 1:3% of inventories with  = 10:0, which
generates the almost same quantitative results as our benchmark model.
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in this model and (ii) there are aspects of the stockout problem that we do not model
such as the reputation cost of a stockout. For N = 1:73, Uss=Sss is 4:2 quarters; as N
becomes higher, the unsold goods in the steady state becomes greater. Because of the
cost of losing varieties (Qss = 0:63, i.e., the buyersstockout probability is 37%), the
intermediate goods price is strictly lower than the nal goods price in the steady state;
PMss = 0:93. The e¤ects of changing N are discussed in Section 3.5.1.
In terms of the exogenous shock processes, because sales are not necessarily equal
to output in our model, our model has relative advantage to investigate the relative
importance of demand and supply shocks.29 In this respect, we employ a simple moment
matching to x the parameters of exogenous shock processes together with the size of
idiosyncratic shock N in Section 3.3.
Finally, as discussed in Section 2.1.2, we assume that labour supply cannot respond
to the current period aggregate shocks.30 This is because otherwise if production
can respond to all aggregate shocks, the model cannot generate a sudden decline
in the inventory holdings right after a demand shock at aggregate level.31 Even if
all information is available for labour supply decision, inventory facts are satised in
aggregate almost equally well at business cycle frequencies, but inventories work little
as a bu¤er stock. To see its importance quantitatively, Section 3.5.2 discusses the e¤ect
of changing this information assumption.
[Table 2: Parameters around here]
[Table 3: Steady State around here]
3.3 Moment Matching
To pin down the parameters of aggregate supply, aggregate demand and idiosyncratic
shocks, we conduct a simple moment matching, in which we seek the parameter values of
these shock processes to minimize the (weighted) sum of squared gaps of the seven key
moments between the model and the US data. Note that, in our stochastic simulations,
the generated second moments are also stochastic; hence, we put more weights on the
moments that are simulated more precisely in the stochastic simulations, see Appendix
A.3 for more details. This method is in spirit similar to Crucini Residual method as
employed in Khan and Thomas (2007a).
29The exogenous shock processes do not a¤ect the non-stochastic steady state.
30This plays a similar role of the capital adjustment cost in Wen (2011). However, given strong
crowding out e¤ect that we are going to discuss in Section 3.4, it leads to too low variability of capital
investment; see Table 3 in Wen (2011). Setting aside the model performance, we also believe, given
infrequent labor contract, assuming information imperfection in labour supply seems to be relatively
safe choice in adding an aggregate real rigidity.
31The idiosyncratic shock is unanticipated but it is integrated out in aggregation. Note also that
information assumption does not a¤ect the non-stochastic steady state.
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The four key parameters to be estimatedare: the AR(1) coe¢ cient on the demand
shock C , the AR(1) coe¢ cient on the supply shock M , the ratio of the standard
deviations of the innovations to both shocks C=M and the size of the idiosyncratic
shocks N . In terms of the target moments to be matched, we have two groups. First,
as we are interested in the relative importance of demand and supply shocks, we found
that it is useful to target (i) the contemporaneous correlation between wages and output
cor fW;Y g and (ii) the ratio of the standard deviation of consumption relative to that
of output sd (C) =sd (Y ). It is well-known, for example, that the correlation of wage to
output is near +1 if the shock is on the supply side, while it is almost  1 for the demand
shock; see Bencivanga 1992 for example. Analogously, it is well-known that the variance
of consumption to output is less in an RCB-type model when supply shocks dominate
demand. Examine the columns under the label of Benchmark (N = 1:73) in Table 5 to
assess the di¤erence between the model based on the demand or supply shocks alone.32
The second group is simply motivated by the following inventory facts; output is
more volatile than sales; inventory investment is procyclical; inventory-to-sales ratio
is countercyclical and persistent. For the correlation between inventory investment
(as percentage of GDP) and output, we focus on cor fdU=Y; Y g at higher frequencies
because, as Wen (2005) reported, the cyclicality of the inventory investment is expected
to be quite di¤erent between demand and supply shocks at high frequencies. On the
other hand, at business cycle frequencies, cor fdU=Y; Y g and cor fdU=Y; Sg are almost
same, given very high correlation between output Y and sales S.
The resultant parameter values and moments are listed in Table 4. First, we nd
that the idiosyncratic shock is relatively large (N = 1:73); compare Tables 5 and 6 to
see its e¤ects. As discussed above, this large value is necessary to generate su¢ ciently
large inventory uctuations in our model. Second, both shocks are fairly persistent.
Third, the ratio of the innovations to the supply and demand shocks is 0:504 : 1. Also,
since supply shock is less persistent, the ratio of supply and demand shock volatilities
is 0:228 : 1. In this naïve comparison, the supply shock is much less volatile than the
demand shock.33
For the third point above, however, it is premature to conclude that the supply shock
is less important than the demand shock. Actually, as shown in our numerical results in
Table 5, output volatility is almost one half with demand shock only than with supply
shock only. This is not surprising because the supply shock directly a¤ects output, and
indeed if instead we focus on the consumption volatility it is greater for the demand
shock than for the supply shock. In terms of cor fW;Y g and sd (C) =sd (Y ), the data
moments are both near the simple average between supply shock only and demand shock
32Note that Table 1 is not directly comparable with Table 5 because the former employs a lter, while
the latter uses growth rates.
33Note that 0:23 : 1 = 0:504=(1  0:876) : 1=(1  0:944).
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only cases. All in all, in our model, it seems that the supply and demand shocks are
almost equally important.
[Table 4: Moment Matching around here]
3.4 Simulation Results
We nd that, while adding the stockout constraint does not deteriorate the model
performance in mimicking the RBC facts, it can explain the inventory facts fairly well.
To capture the essence, we would like to introduce simplied, though not exact, demand
equations. Since the e¤ects via Qt is quantitatively small, ignoring the cost of losing
varieties (i.e., keeping Qt = 1 so that St = Y Ft ), we can rewrite (2b), (12) and (16c) as:
Y Mt = Ct + It + (Ut+1   Ut); (25a)
St = Ct + It (25b)
St = S






where note that (25c) schematically captures the fact that goods on shelf Y Mt + Ut is
complimentary to demand M bt in generating sales, as discussed in Section 2.4.1.
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3.4.1 RBC Facts
In terms of working hours, our model performs similarly to the standard RBC model.
Hours are less volatile than output for the supply shock and vice versa for the demand
shock. Wage and labour productivity are almost perfectly positively correlated to
output Y Mt for the supply shock. In contrast, with the demand shock, it is almost
perfectly negatively correlated to Y Mt , as found in Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992)
for government expenditure shock and Bencivenga (1992) for preference shock. For both
shocks, capital investment is as volatile as the data,35 although it is slightly less volatile
for the demand shock, because it is crowded out by consumption. The volatility of
investment is too high in the no-inventory case because inventories compete with capital
in the sense that the former generates sales while the latter generates output. In a sense,
inventory and capital investments also crowd out each other to some extent.
To see these crowding-out among capital investment It, inventory investment
Ut+1 Ut and consumption Ct, see Figure 1. Under C = 0:944, capital investment goes
below the steady state level after a a positive preference (demand) shock, while, at the
date when the shock hits, inventory investment works as a bu¤er. On the quantity side,




t + Ut and






35In Table 5, following convention, for the US data, durable goods consumption is included in capital
investment, not in consumption.
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(25a) implies that, given output, a higher consumption implies either lower capital or
inventory investments or both. On the price side, we can see the increase in interest rate
from the mid left panel of Figure 1, implying that the cost of borrowing for investment
and the Jorgensons user costs for inventories both increase after a positive preference
shock. Hence, from these two aspects, the crowding-out can be explained. The key
parameter here is C ; if we set, say, C = 0:990, capital investment increases signicantly
after a positive preference shock. In this case, although the real interest increases more
sharply, because the consumption is expected to be strong for a longer period, capital
investment increases by increasing output Y Mt sharply. Hence, the shape of IRF of It is
quite sensitive to C , which holds even in the no-inventory case.
[Figure 1: IRFs to Preference (Demand) Shock around here]
[Figure 2: IRFs to Productivity (Supply) Shock around here]
3.4.2 Traditional Two Inventory Facts
For both supply and demand shocks, production is more volatile than sales, and
inventory investment is procyclical (see Table 5). With the supply shock, it is hardly
surprising because the source of shocks lies in the production sector. In our model,
however, even with the demand shock, production is more volatile than sales. To see this,
consider the upper left panel of Figure 1. First, right after a positive preference (demand)
shock, the inventory investment decreases, simply because intermediate goods producers
use inventories as a bu¤er to accommodate a sudden increase in demand. As discussed
in Section 2.4.2, inventories also work as a bu¤er stock in our model, even without the
idiosyncratic shock (N = 0).36 Subsequently, however, inventory investment increases,
because, in generating sales, inventories and demand are compliments as discussed in
Section 2.4.1. To capture a strong demand, intermediate goods rms want to accumulate
inventories (which we call distributorsdemand), they must produce more than what
they sell; see also (25a).37
As a result, as previously reported and discussed by Wen (2005), if we apply a high-
frequency lter, we nd corfdU=Y; Sg =  0:42 and corfdU=Y; Y g = 0:49 in the US
data; see Table 5. This captures the bu¤er stock behavior of inventories. However,
at the business cycle frequencies, the distributors demand plays a more important
36More closely looking into the inventory behavior, we nd that inventories work as a bu¤er mainly
because of our information assumption that labour supply cannot react to the current period aggregate
shocks. Under our function and parameter assumptions, the e¤ects of intertemporal substitution on the
production side are quite weak. In other words, though it is surely working, the production smoothing
due to a convex cost is quantitatively very weak in our model.
37Actually, distributorsdemand works even for a positive productivity shock, as long as it leads to an
increase in demand, although productivity shocks can mimic the two traditional inventory facts without
the help of this mechanism. In addition, as shown in the upper left panel of Figure 2, mainly because
capital investment increases sharply, to accommodate this initial strong demand, inventory investment
decreases slightly right after a positive supply shock.
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role, which adds demands on top of consumption and capital investment; see (25b).
Hence, as reported in Table 5, corfdU=Y; Y g is 0:98 and 0:47 for supply and demand
shocks respectively; i.e., inventory investment is procyclical in business cycle frequencies
for both shocks. At rst glance, these nding leads us to postulate that inventories
suppresses the e¤ects of demand shocks at high frequencies but amplies them at
business cycle frequencies. However, we actually nd not, which we discuss in Sections
3.5.1 and 3.5.2.
[Table 5: Key Second Moments around here]
[Table 6: Key Second Moments for Di¤erent Idiosyncratic Shock around here]
3.4.3 Inventory to Sales Ratio
The inventory to sales ratio (I/S ratio) is countercyclical and persistent in the calibrated
and estimated versions of our model (see Tables 5 and 6). The behavior of I/S ratio is
mainly governed by the cost of carry of unsold goods U;jt  Et[t;t+1U;jt+1] as shown in (23),
and hence is governed by interest rate RBt . Intuitively, when the economy booms, high
RBt discourages intermediate rms from having inventories relative to expected sales.
Hence, roughly speaking, the countercyclicality and persistence of I/S ratio are due to
the procyclicality and persistence of the interest rate in our model.38 Quantitatively,
compared to the data, our model generates the persistence in the I/S ratio similar to
the data but its volatility is relatively low and its correlation with output is too large
negative for both shocks. In Table 5, we see that corfU=S; Y g (correlation between I/S
ratio and output) is  0:52 in the US data, while it is  0:91 in our benchmark simulation
(N = 1:73), while the rst autocorrelation of I/S ratio is 0:88 in the data and is 0:92
in the simulation.
3.4.4 Intermediate Goods Price, Markups and Elasticity of Substitution







39 that are both
positively correlated with output (see Table 5) with their impulse response functions
almost identical shapes to each other though di¤erent magnitude (see Figures 1 and 2).
This is because the e¤ective elasticity of substitution ~t is countercyclical for both shocks;
see (22) for the denition of ~t. The intuition of this is closely related to that of I/S
ratio. That is, interest rate RBt tends to be higher in booms, which leads to a higher cost
of carry of unsold goods Ut+1, meaning that the optimal inventory holdings relative to
38However, there is a mechanism that generates a small degree of endogenous persistence; see Section
3.5.3.
39The latter (sales price/marginal cost) is the standard denition of markup in the absence of
inventories. But, with inventories, (21b) and (21c) imply that it is the shadow price of unsold goods Ut
that corresponds to the concept of the cost of salesin accounting. In this sense, PMt =
U
t is the proper




sales becomes lower. To reduce the risk of having their goods unsold, intermediate goods
rms accept a high stockout probability t and a concomitant loss of sales opportunities
~t. Because the e¤ects of Qt, which is low in booms, are quantitatively small under our
parameter setting, the behavior of ~t is dominated by ~t. In data, the evidence on the
mark-up is inconclusive. For example, Martins and Scarpetta (1999) are supportive of
a procyclical markup,40 while Small (1997) and Nishimura, Ohkusa, and Ariga (1999)
nd some evidence of a countercyclical markup; others such as Marchetti (2002) draw
an indenite conclusion. See also Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) among others for the
importance of the cyclicality of markup in optimal monetary policy settings.
3.5 E¤ects of Changing Parameters
In this subsection, we investigate the e¤ects of changing three parameters: (i) the
standard deviation of idiosyncratic shocks N ; (ii) the share of observable component in
the aggregate shocks ; and (iii) the persistence of the exogenous shocks C and M . We
investigate the e¤ects of changing N and , not only to check the robustness but also
to draw some implications on the causes of the Great Moderation. In addition to the two
leading explanations good monetary policy and good luck Kahn, McConnell, and
Perez-Quiros (2002) suggest that the increase in output stability observed since around
1980 in the U.S. may be due to the improvement in inventory management, which
may have been induced by new IT technologies. In our model, improved inventory
management can be interpreted as a lower N and more information available at the
timing of labour supply decision.
In accounting for the reduction of the volatility of total output, Kahn, McConnell,
and Perez-Quiros (2002) reports the following key observations started at around early
1980s; (i) output volatility has decreased, which can be partly explained by the reduction
in sales volatility; (ii) in light of the evolution of inventories, the reduction of output
volatility relative to sales volatility is mainly accounted for by the decreases in both
inventory investment volatility and correlation between inventory investment and sales;
(iii) the level and the uctuation of I/S ratio have declined. Our Tables 7, 8 and 9
e¤ectively correspond to their variance decomposition using the equations equivalent to
(25a) and (25b); see Appendix A.5.
[Table 7: Decomposition of Output Variance: US data around here]
3.5.1 Size of Idiosyncratic Shocks N
Table 8 shows that changes in N have little e¤ect on output volatility in our model under
either shock. On the one hand, given demand volatility, lower N reduces the volatility
40See also Bils and Kahn (2000).
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of inventory investment and its correlation with sales; hence, for both shocks, output
volatility relative to sales volatility increases as N increases. In this sense, our model
captures the intuition that Kahn, McConnell, and Perez-Quiros (2002) suggested. On
the other hand, however, the volatility of sales increases when N is low. This is because
of the crowding out as discussed above. In booms, inventory investment increases (to
exploit strong demand), which suppresses consumption and capital investment given
resource constraint (25a). However, as N decreases, the e¤ects of this crowding out
decreases and as a result the volatility of consumption and capital investment increases.
Because of these two o¤setting e¤ects, the total e¤ect is not monotone. See also Table
6 for other aspects of changing N .
[Table 8: Decomposition of Output Variance: Di¤erent Idio Shock around here]
3.5.2 Information Available to Labour Supply Decision
Let us also consider the information available at the timing of the labour supply
decision. It is straightforward to decompose shock t into observable component 
ob
t





unt for 0    1.41 Then, we allow labour supply Ht can react
only to obt . In Table 9, we set  as 0 (full information), 0:5 (50% aggregate shocks are
observable for labour supply decision) and 1:0 (labour supply is decided before observing
the current period aggregate shocks, benchmark). As is clear from Table 9, there is little
impact on the variance decomposition. In our model setting, this information a¤ects
mainly the high frequency inventory behavior and not the model behavior at business
cycle frequencies. Note that, since the information assumption is irrelevant to the non-
stochastic steady state, I/S ratio at the steady state is not a¤ected by .
Closer investigation tells us a bit more story. First, a lack of information has a
direct e¤ect on output volatility; since labour supply cannot react to unobservable
shocks, the lack of information directly suppresses output volatility. Second, however,
for example, right after a positive demand shock (which is captured by high-frequency
ltered moments), less responsive labour supply causes a drop in inventory investment.
Hence, in the subsequent periods, production must increase so that inventories catch up
with sales. This distributorsdemand increases the procyclicality of inventory investment
in the business cycle frequencies. These two e¤ects o¤set each other, leading to little
e¤ects in total.
[Table 9: Decomposition of Output Variance: Di¤erent Information around here]
41Here, obt and 
un
t both follow a normal distribution with the same variance as t.
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3.5.3 Non-Persistent Shocks
This subsection examines the model behavior with i:i:d: aggregate shocks. All in all, the
model performance is poor with i:i:d: shocks. But, this exercise allows us to eliminate
the e¤ects of distributorsdemand (since there is no predictable components in shocks),
allowing inventories to play only the role of a bu¤er stock. Table 10 shows the result
when (i) capital stock is xed by xing capital investment at the level of steady state
depreciation, (ii) labor supply is determined after observing all aggregate shocks up to
the current period (perfect information). The former means that we shut down the
crowding out that we discussed above. For the latter, note that, if labor is determined
after observing the demand shock, since capital is predetermined, output cannot react to
the demand shock, meaning that the demand shock has no e¤ects on quantities such as
consumption and output. Also, since i:i:d: implies that the most uctuations concentrate
on high frequencies, we use (iii) band pass lter for 2 to 40 quarters. Under these setup,
we know that production smoothing is solely due to the convex cost function. The
main nding is that bu¤er stock inventories generate persistence in some small degree.
For i:i:d: demand shocks, on the one hand, output is persistent, because of production
smoothing. Intermediate rms optimally choose to accommodate unexpected strong
demand by reducing inventories right after a positive demand shock, not by increasing
production. In subsequent periods, intermediate rms increase their production to
recover their lost inventories. Hence, inventories as a bu¤er stock generate persistent
output from i:i:d: demand shocks; in this version of the model, the rst autocorrelation
of Y Mt is 0:44. For i:i:d: supply shocks, on the other hand, sales is persistent, because
of consumption smoothing. Rather than consuming a sudden increase in output at one
time, such an increase in output is stored in the form of inventories. Hence, inventories
as a bu¤er stock generate persistent sales from i:i:d: supply shocks. These exercises
show that bu¤er stock inventories not only insulate production from demand shocks
but also insulate demand from supply shocks in general equilibrium. Finally, with i:i:d:
shocks, the correlation between output and sales is much lower, and, because inventories
gradually return back to the steady state level, the I/S ratio is persistent.
[Table 10: Persistence under of iid Aggregate Shocks around here]
3.6 Summary of Numerical Results
In terms of the standard RBC facts, our model inherits most of the features from the
standard RBC model. The only di¤erence is a less volatile capital investment than a
standard RBC model, because inventory investment competes with capital investment
and crowd outs in some degree, allowing a better, though slightly, t with the US data.
With specic reference to the basic inventory facts, the model performs well. The
key intuition is distributorsdemand. Since the target level of inventories is increasing
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in demand, if there is one unit of increase in demand, the target level of inventories
becomes higher. Hence, after a positive demand shock, inventory investment becomes
positive (procyclical inventory investment), and output must increase more than sales
to accumulate inventories. Because of this, the inventory behavior is strongly a¤ected
by the expected demand. The behavior of inventories relative to sales is mainly a¤ected
by interest rate (through the cost of carry of inventories). We nd that in booms with
high interest rates, sellers optimally choose a lower I/S ratio by accepting high stockout
probability, which leads to both countercyclical and persistent I/S ratio.
In our discussion, the existence of inventories (due to the stockout constraint) may
seem to amplify shocks at rst glance, which is true only given size of the demand
uctuations. However, in general equilibrium, where demand is also endogenous,
inventory investment crowds out capital investment, and to a lesser decree consumption
as well. Hence, an increase in inventory investment in boom suppresses the increases
in capital investment and consumption; as a result, inventory investment suppresses
the volatility of sales (demand). In this respect, it is fair to say that, certainly, our
model captures most of the mechanism discussed by Kahn, McConnell, and Perez-Quiros
(2002), our model does not provide strong support for the hypothesis that improvements
in inventory management have reduced GDP volatility.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate a dynamic general equilibrium model with a stockout
constraint faced by intermediate goods producers. The stockout constraint means that,
even if demand is strong, sellers cannot sell more than the goods on shelf that they have.
Because of this, to generate sales, sellers need inventories; i.e., sellers hold inventories to
overcome the constraint when they distribute their goods. The key trade-o¤ is that (a)
having too few inventories is costly because it leads to too high a stockout probability,
while (b) having too much inventories is also costly because it leads to too high a
cost of carrying inventories. The former implies that the optimal level of inventories
is increasing in demand, which explains why inventory investment is procyclical. In
booms, sellers have to produce not only to accommodate strong demand but also to
accumulate inventories to generate sales, which we call distributorsdemand because
sellers need inventories to distribute their products to buyers. In the presence of the
stockout constraint, hence, one unit of increase in demand leads to more than one unit
of increase in output. The latter implies that the optimal level of inventories relative to
sales is strongly a¤ected by interest rate (cost of carry), which explain why inventory to
sales ratio is persistent and countercyclical; see Bernanke and Gertler (1995).
Note that the above observations hold mainly at business cycle frequencies. For
high frequency behavior, our model also naturally incorporates the production smooth
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motivation of inventories, where sellers want to avoid volatile production paths given
convex cost function. That is, sellers allow inventories to decline right after an
unanticipated demand shock, which is captured by the negative correlation between
inventory investment and sales at high frequencies; see Wen (2005). Also, at rst glance,
it might be tempted to conclude that the distributorsdemand discussed above may
amplify the output volatility. In our model, certainly, given demand uctuations, the
stockout constraint amplies it; production is more volatile than sales. The mechanism
behind it is almost the same as what Kahn, McConnell, and Perez-Quiros (2002) argue
in explaining the Great Moderation. However, because of the resource constraint, having
more inventories crowds out capital investment and consumption. Hence, as shown in
our numerical experiment, as we reduce the e¤ects of the stockout constraint, the lower
crowding out e¤ect raises the demand volatility. In total, we see (a) output volatility
relative to sales decreases, but (b) the volatility of sales increases. All in all, under
our model setup and parameters, improving inventory management cannot explain the
Great Moderation.
The most closely related work to our model is Wen (2011), where he treats the
stockout constraint as buyersproblem by conating demand and supply sides, which
keeps his model simple. In contrast, we explicitly consider the double-sided nature of the
stockout constraint from the perspective of both sellers and buyers. Here, we emphasize
that the stockout constraint is the inventory management problem of sellers. In our
view, while an (S,s) model may be suitable to study inventories on the buyersside, the
stockout model allows us to focus on the sellersinventory management problem as well.
Because of this, for example, we can explicitly investigate the stockout probabilities of
sellers and buyers separately. More importantly, however, our analysis explains why
Khan and Thomas (2007a) nd very di¤erent results from ours as well as Wens (2011).
In their seminal paper, they nd that, while their (S,s) ordering model is successful in
explaining inventory facts, their version of the stockout constraint model fails to generate
a su¢ ciently high average inventory level, which means that it cannot explain business
cycle uctuations, as opposed to our numerical analysis of the contribution of inventories
to business cycle uctuations. By explicitly analyzing sellers and buyers separately,
we show that it is important to assume (1) a small degree of price inexibility,42 (iii)
production decision before observing demand shocks and (ii) positive net prot margin.
For (i) and (ii), as discussed in Section 2.1.2, the stockout constraint is negated by either
price adjustment or production adjustment after observing demand shocks; sellers have
to hold inventories because of demand uncertainty, but such uncertainty has no e¤ects
if either of them is possible. For (iii), while to accept the risk of incurring the cost
42Note that as discussed in Section 2.1.2, this price rigidity, which we call price posting is only within
one period and hence in aggregate there is no price stickiness over the period. In this sense, our model
falls into the class of exible price model.
29
of carrying inventories, sellers must be compensated by positive prot when goods are
sold; zero prot margin means that the return on inventory investment is negative in
expectation.
Finally, as shown in our analytical and numerical results, the interest rate plays
a key roll in determining the behavior of inventories and markups (via the user cost
of inventories). Although monetary policy is absent in our model, as Bernanke and
Gertler (1995) suggest, inventories may have an important interaction with monetary
policy.43 Indeed, given the extensive recent development of dynamic macroeconomic
models to incorporate nancial spreads, it has not escaped our attention that inventory
management may play an important role in the monetary policy transmission but we
leave this question to future research.
43Many New Keynesian authors have suggested reasons for the continuing importance of inventories:
Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) and Kashyap, Lamont, and Stein (1994), point to inventories as collateral
for external nance, while Bernanke and Gertler (1995) show that inventory investment responds quickly
to a monetary policy shock. Also, Kahn, McConnell, and Perez-Quiros (2002) suggest that improved
inventory management techniques may provide a clue understanding the long 1990s expansion, which
continued until 2008, and the so-called Great Moderation. We extend our analysis to the sticky price




In this Appendix, we would like to raise an attention that there is a counterintuitive
behavior at the level of individual intermediate goods producers.44 Under the assumption
of the log-normal idiosyncratic demand shock, roughly speaking, the worst possible
demand is such that a seller or producer observes zero buyers. In this case, this producer
is forced to carry all of his products to the next period as unsold goods. If hypothetically
the optimal target of the goods on shelf is unchanged, the unsold goods carried from the
previous period already meet this target in the next period as well, meaning that his
optimal production is zero at t+1. In stochastic simulations, however, the optimal goods
on shelf is a function of mainly aggregate expected sales and interest rate (via the cost
of carry), and hence it changes over time. Thus, there is a possibility of having negative
production at individual producers level, especially when the aggregate demand is lower
than the previous period. However, we argue that this is not a signicant problem,
especially for the aggregate behavior of the model. First, production never becomes
negative in aggregate. Second, given our persistent aggregate shocks, such negative
production at individual producer level is small in magnitude. Third, it is possible
to eliminate such negative production by assuming a distribution function with some
positive lower bound (such as uniform) for the idiosyncratic shock. Indeed, the earlier
version of this paper employed a uniform distribution for the idiosyncratic shocks, but
there was no sensible di¤erence given linearization technique in our simulations, although
the algebraic expression becomes messier with uniform distribution. Finally, certainly,
allowing negative production is counter-intuitive, but there is no internal inconsistency.
Under our timing assumption that production decision is made before observing the
idiosyncratic shock, they cannot liquidate their unsold goods by producing a negative
amount, meaning that some sellers still have to carry their unsold goods to the next
period.
A.2 Perfect Substitution
This appendix sketches the proof that the model economy reduces to the standard RBC
model when  ! 1 (perfect substitute). Though it is rather intuitive, the exact
derivation proves that limiting case shows some complicated behavior, which could
be potentially interesting. First, dividing (21a) by , it is clear that, as  ! 1,
(PM;jit   U;jit ) ! 0 and/or ~jit ! 1 must hold. However, the former cannot be true,
because it implies that (21b) would not satisfy a transversality condition. Actually,
~jit ! 1 and, at the limit, (21b) reduces toEt[t;t+1fPM;jit+1  U;jit+1g] = U;jit  Et[t;t+1U;jit+1 ]
44We thank the Editor for pointing this out.
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(the expected gross prot margin just covers the cost of carrying inventories) and
U;jit = Et[t;t+1
MC;ji
t+1 ] 6= 0 (interestingly we can calculate the shadow price of U jit+1,
even though U jit+1 does not exist). Also, because P
M;ji
t ! MC;jit as  ! 1 and
constant returns to scale guarantees MC;jit is the same for all ji, (21c) directly shows
that PM;jit ! MCt . Furthermore, (8) implies PMt ! 1 (= nal goods price), and hence
MCt ! 1.
Second, (16a) implies that gjit ! gl and hence jit ! 1, as ~jit ! 1, where gl is
the lower support of gjit (under our log-normal distribution assumption, gl =  1).
Intuitively, as  ! 1, the net prot margin (gross prot margin minus the cost of
carry) becomes zero, meaning that (i) even if the marginal U jit+1 is sold in the next
period, sellers does not appreciate such a sales very much since the net prot is zero,
but (ii) if U jit+1 is unsold, sellers simply have to pay its cost of carry 
U;j
t  Et[t;t+1U;jt+1].
That is, having unsold goods is a one-sided unfair betting; i.e., get zero if win, but pay
some if lose. Because sellers do not care about the loss of sales opportunity in this
case, sellers optimally choose Gjit as if they see the minimum possible number of buyers
Nl (N
ji
t = Nl for all ji). Hence, the stockout always takes place, which means that
e¤ectively sellers do not care about demand uncertainty. Thus, U jit+1 ! 0 for all ji,
unless the cost of carry is negative; i.e., unless sellers expect a sharp increase in the
marginal cost of production in the future.
Third, (9) implies that M b;jit !MFt =Qt, which means that, if a buyer has an access
to Qt% of varieties, he buys each available variety by MFt =Qt, and his total purchase
is just MFt (not a¤ected by Qt or Nt) . Since Qt ! Nl (intuitively because 1   Qt is
the stockout probability for buyers and such probability must be (1 Nl)=1, where 1 is
the total number, or measure, of buyers), M jit ! MFt . Since neither Nl nor gl a¤ects
M jit , G
ji
t ! MFt for all ji. At the limit, MFt = Y Mt = Gjit since U jit+1 = 0 (again, unless
Et[t;t+1
U;j
t+1]   U;jt > 0). Note that, under our log-normality assumption, Nl = 0,
and hence Qt ! 0 and M b;jit ! 1, which may sound strange. But, the above results
still hold, because they approach to 0 and 1 at balanced speeds; QtM b;jit = MFt .
Roughly speaking, this is the situation in which each buyer can buy an innitesimally
small number of varieties, say, one out of a million, and buy a huge amount of this single
variety of goods. This does not cause any problem; since all goods are perfect substitute,
buyers do not need to visit more than one market.
In sum, unless the cost of carry becomes negative, at the limit that  !1, (i) there
is no unsold goods U jit+1 = 0 and hence no inventory investment U
ji
t+1 U jit = 0, (ii) sales






t , (iii) buyers can achieve their purchasing index
MFt without su¤ering from the cost of losing varieties, (iv) sellers choose the marginal
cost pricing; PM;jit = 
MC
t = 1 (= nal goods price), and (v) although stockout always
takes place, stockout does not have any importance for both sellers and buyers. Since all
other parts of the equilibrium are the same as the standard RBC model, this completes
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the sketch of the proof. These results hold for a general class of distribution functions
of the idiosyncratic shock.
A.3 Moment Matching
We implement our moment matching procedure as follows. First, let  be the vector of
parameters to be pinned down. Then, depending on the actual value of , the model
generates a given set of moments m (), where we explicitly write the moments as
functions of parameters. In the stochastic simulation with a nite simulation period
(142 quarters, which is the same as our data length), m () has some distribution.
Letting H 1 () be the variance and covariance of m () in this stochastic simulation,
we use its inverse as weights to allocate the relative importance of the target moments.
If, for example, hypothetically H 1 () is diagonal (that is where there is no correlation
among moments), then the weights are simply equivalent to precision of each estimate;


















xed; otherwise, minimization would seek a high precision instead of a small distance




takes a di¤erent values for
each , we need to employ a sequence of iterations to ensure  = . That is, once this




by H () and solve the
minimization problem until  = .
A.4 Inventories as Options to Sell
This subsection compares the rst order conditions with respect to unsold goods U jit+1
with the Black-Scholes option pricing formula. That is, we claim that having inventories
is having options to sell. For comparison sake, we reproduce Jorgensons user cost

























1 (ST > K)
i
= V callt ;
45For this representation, see equation (12.7) (and p.90 for notation) in Bjork (2004) among others.
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where ST is the price of underlying stock at expiration date T and K is the strike price.
Also, indicator function 1 (ST > K) is 1 if ST > K but is 0 otherwise, and E
Q
t [] is
the expectation operator under the risk-neutral probability. This expression simply says
that the cost of purchasing a call option V callt is equal to the present value of ST   K
conditional that the call is in-the-money (i.e., ST > K) under the risk-neutral measure
with respect to ST .
There are clear one-to-one relationships:46 (i) cost of holding option: U;jit  
Et[t;t+1
U;ji
t+1 ] vs. V
call
t ; (ii) discount factor: t;t+1 vs. e
 r(T t); (iii) prot margin:
PM;jit+1   U;jit+1 if Gjit+1 > M jit+1 vs. ST  K if ST > K:Note that, since intermediate rms
are risk neutral by constant returns to scale, the di¤erence between Et[] and EQt [] does
not really matter in this comparison. Finally, note that the option payo¤ is kinked on
the maturity date but is di¤erentiable (and hence an option delta exists) before the
maturity date, because of the uncertainty in the stock price ST , which is exactly parallel
to the reason why we can di¤erentiate the expected sales, but not sales itself.
A.5 Variance Decomposition of Output
We summarize the demand side equations as follows:
law of motion for inventories: Yt = (Ut+1   Ut) + St; (27a)




goods market clearing: Yt = Ct + It: (27c)
where we use (12b) and (12c) for (27a), (18) and (9) for (27b), and (2b) for (27c). Hence,



















+ V [St=Sss] ; (28)






































V [Qt=Qss] : (29)
46In addition, the di¤erence between N (d2) and N (d1) in the standard Black-Scholes formula (see
any textbook for these notations) is almost exactly the same as the di¤erence between t and ~t. This is
not by chance; we can interpret N (d2) as the probability that ST > K under the risk-neutral measure,
while it can be shown that N (d1) = E
Q
t [ST =St jST > K]N (d2); compare this with (16b).
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Table 1: Peak-to-Trough Inventory Investment Change as a % of GDP Drop
A B C D
Peak Trough (= D=C) GDP Growth Contribution
1948.4 1949.4 210.8 204.3 -7.2 -14.8
1953.2 1954.2 65.5 66.4 -10.7 -7.1
1957.3 1958.2 98.2 98.3 -13.5 -13.3
1960.2 1961.1 161.1 160.1 -2.7 -4.2
1969.4 1970.4 592.3 585.3 -0.6 -3.8
1973.4 1975.1 69.3 70.4 -13.0 -9.1
1980.1 1980.3 69.9 70.6 -8.6 -6.1
1981.3 1982.4 98.9 98.9 -2.6 -2.6
1990.3 1991.1 46.3 46.3 -1.4 -0.6
2001.1 2001.4 -65.3 -64.1 3.0 -1.9
2007.4 2009.2 31.7 33.1 -15.6 -5.2
Notes: The peaks and troughs show NBER business cycle dates (as of January 2013).
A = change in inventory investment at trough   that at peakGDP at trough   GDP at peak
D = change in inventory investment at trough   that at peakGDP at peak , which is the contribution of inventory
investment to GDP growth rate.
Table 2: Parameters
Symbol Name Benchmark
 subjective discount factor 0.986

 relative risk aversion 1.000
 relative weight for leisure 0.650
 elasticity of substitution of intermediate goods 7.500
 capital share in production 0.350
 depreciation rate of capital 0.015
N size parameter of the idio shock* 1.725
C AR(1) coef of preference shock* 0.944
M AR(1) coef of productivity shock* 0.876
C sd of innov to preference shock* 0.011
M sd of innov to productivity shock* 0.005
Note: Items with * (M , U , C=M and N) are estimated by the moment matching
to inventory related second moments. The other parameters are determined so that the
steady state values match to the data. Note that  = 1 means that labour supply is
determined before observing all aggregate shocks.
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Table 3: Steady State Values
No Invent. Low Invent. Benchmark
Name (N = 0:00) (N = 0:40) (N = 1:73)
RB gross return on bonds 1.015 1.015 1.015
RK net return on capital 1.030 1.030 1.030
W wage 1.970 1.928 1.611
PM price index of intermediate goods 1.000 0.996 0.931
Q measure of available variety 1.000 0.972 0.629
 Pr[Stockout] for sellers - 0.081 0.061
~ cost of losing sales opportunity - 0.158 0.570
U shadow price of unsold goods - 0.842 0.750
MC marginal cost of intermediate production - 0.855 0.761
C consumption 1.061 1.038 0.868
H hours 0.358 0.354 0.334
Y F output of nal goods 1.253 1.224 1.014
Y M output of intermediate goods 1.253 1.229 1.089
I capital investment 0.192 0.186 0.147
S sales of intermediate goods 1.253 1.229 1.089
U unsold goods 0.000 0.816 4.578
K capital 12.804 12.392 9.774
Note: See the footnote on Table 2.
Table 4: Moment Matching
Data Matched Param & Mom Dem Shk Sup Shk
US low 5% up 95% Only Only
- Estimated Parameters
C  0.944   0.944 
M  0.876    0.876
M=C  0.504   0.000 1















* -0.425 -0.690 -0.757 -0.611 -0.846 -0.619







-0.516 -0.911 -0.938 -0.876 -0.965 -0.910
sd(C)=sd(Y ) 0.565 0.623 0.468 0.809 1.347 0.164








0.881 0.923 0.898 0.942 0.927 0.920
Note: * indicates that the high band-pass lter of 2-4 quarters is applied and, for the
others, the business cycle band-pass lter of 8-40 quarters is applied.
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Table 5: Key Second Moments
US data Benchmark (N = 1:73)
Both Dem Shock Sup Shock
rel sd corr rel sd corr rel sd corr rel sd corr
- Band pass lter with 8 to 40 quarters
Y M 1.18 1.00 1.30 1.00 0.58 1.00 1.16 1.00
S 0.83 0.96 0.68 0.97 0.90 0.96 0.62 0.99
H 1.08 0.84 1.01 0.94 1.57 1.00 0.81 0.99
C 0.56 0.86 0.63 0.54 1.35 0.93 0.16 0.67
I 2.99 0.96 3.25 0.71 2.35 -0.74 3.41 0.99
U
S
1.35 -0.52 0.77 -0.91 1.03 -0.96 0.69 -0.91
dUt+1
YM
0.23 0.64 0.37 0.90 0.27 0.47 0.40 0.98
Q - - 0.27 -0.88 0.38 -0.95 0.23 -0.89
 - - 0.96 0.88 1.39 0.95 0.83 0.89
~ - - 0.34 0.88 0.48 0.95 0.29 0.89
PM
U
- - 0.04 0.88 0.06 0.95 0.04 0.89
PM
MC
- - 0.03 0.88 0.04 0.95 0.02 0.89
~ - - 0.18 -0.88 0.26 -0.95 0.15 -0.89
W 0.61 -0.15 0.35 -0.03 0.67 -1.00 0.19 0.81
YM
H


















- 0.61 - 0.70 - 0.72 - 0.70
- Band pass lter with 2 to 4 quarters
corf dUY ;Y g - 0.49 - 0.71 - 0.91 - 0.48
corf dUY ;Sg - -0.42 - -0.68 - -0.85 - -0.62
Notes: The rel sd and corr are standard deviation relative to that of output (total
intermediate production) and correlation with GDP, respectively, except for rel sd of
Y M which shows the sd of intermediate production. The main sources of US data are
US NIPA and current employment statistics from 1975Q1 to 2010Q3. RB is e¤ective
Fed Funds rate (FRED2), and PM is PPI for nal goods. Note that U=S is taken from
M3, US Census Bureau, while the inventory investment in dU=Y M is from NIPA. The
band-pass lter (8 to 40 quarters) is applied with a maximum lag length of K=12.
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Table 6: Key Second Moments for Di¤erent Idiosyncratic Shock
No-Inventories (N = 0:00) Low Inventories (N = 0:40)
Both Dem Shock Sup Shock Both Dem Shock Sup Shock
rel sd corr rel sd corr rel sd corr rel sd corr rel sd corr rel sd corr
- Band pass lter with 8 to 40 quarters
Y M 1.30 1.00 0.63 1.00 1.14 1.00 1.29 1.00 0.62 1.00 1.13 1.00
S 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.91 1.00 0.92 1.00 0.91 1.00
H 1.04 0.94 1.60 1.00 0.80 0.99 1.04 0.94 1.60 1.00 0.79 0.99
C 0.65 0.63 1.26 0.92 0.22 0.79 0.65 0.62 1.28 0.93 0.21 0.78
I 5.10 0.84 2.69 0.00 5.61 0.99 4.62 0.80 2.73 -0.23 5.02 0.99
U
S
- - - - - - 0.89 -0.90 0.98 -0.95 0.86 -0.89
dUt+1
YM
- - - - - - 0.11 0.84 0.10 0.79 0.11 0.86
Q - - - - - - 0.05 -0.90 0.05 -0.94 0.04 -0.89
 - - - - - - 1.57 0.90 1.85 0.94 1.48 0.89
~ - - - - - - 1.29 0.90 1.52 0.94 1.22 0.89
PM
U
- - - - - - 0.04 0.90 0.04 0.94 0.03 0.89
PM
MC
- - - - - - 0.01 0.90 0.01 0.94 0.01 0.89
~ - - - - - - 0.20 -0.90 0.23 -0.94 0.19 -0.89
W 0.37 0.07 0.60 -1.00 0.25 0.87 0.37 0.04 0.61 -1.00 0.24 0.86
YM
H


















- - - - - - - 0.67 - 0.69 - 0.67
- Band pass lter with 2 to 4 quarters
corf dUY ;Y g - - - - - - - 0.76 - 0.97 - 0.50
corf dUY ;Sg - - - - - - - -0.12 - 0.27 - -0.31











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1: Selected impulse response functions to 1% positive preference shock.
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Figure 2: Selected impulse response functions to 1% positive supply shock.
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